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After the Deluge: 1968 in Retrospect
It is impossible to contemplate the fiftieth anni-
versary of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassina-
tion without hearing a whispered “if only.” 
King, after all, was murdered just as he sought 
to expand the Civil Rights Movement’s agenda 
to include an explicit focus on promoting mul-
tiracial economic justice, a cause that has met 
with little success in the intervening years. If 
only he had survived, the whispered voice says, 
he would have transformed the Movement into 
a force that powerfully and effectively fought 
for economic egalitarianism with the same suc-
cess that it had dismantling Jim Crow.
This voice, however, misleads us. King’s 
death did not itself throw the Movement off this 
path. Instead, his assassination serves as a dispir-
iting marker for the moment when the Civil 
Rights Movement’s internal divisions overcame 
its grand moral vision—a vision that King 
believed should encompass a commitment to 
multiracial economic egalitarianism. King’s 
death did not mark the end of the black freedom 
struggle, but it surely marked a transition point. 
The Movement shifted from the streets into the 
legislatures, from political protest to partisan pol-
itics. While there were many gains from the shift, 
it profoundly limited the Movement’s ability to 
be a force for economic justice. The conse-
quences of these limitations have become more 
obvious as King’s death has receded into the past.
A Fractious Movement
At the time of his death, the focus of King’s 
activism had shifted from securing the social 
and political rights of African Americans to a 
more catholic emphasis on combating poverty.1 
He was in the midst of organizing the Poor 
People’s March. He hoped the March would 
replicate the success of 1963’s March for Jobs 
and Freedom that brought a quarter million peo-
ple to the nation’s capital in advance of 
Congress’ consideration of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. King was adamant about bringing a 
racially diverse group of impoverished 
Americans to Washington. They would be a sec-
ond Bonus Army, camping on the National Mall 
and engaging in peaceful civil disobedience. 
Their goal was a dramatic refashioning of the 
welfare state: a guaranteed minimum income, a 
statutory commitment to full employment, a 
massive federal jobs program, and the elimina-
tion of urban slums through the building of half 
a million units of low-income housing per year.
Thus, by 1967, when King started planning 
the March, he had maneuvered one of the main 
institutional manifestations of the Civil Rights 
Movement, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), into a fight explicitly 
aimed at promoting, first and foremost, eco-
nomic justice. This process, however, revealed 
the problems with using the Movement to advo-
cate for redistributive economic policy. King 
met substantial resistance to the March from 
within the Movement. Some of his colleagues 
had tactical objections: the logistics would be 
difficult; it was unreasonable to expect soci-
ety’s most vulnerable to drop everything and 
march to Washington; the public would not be 
sympathetic to their demands. More fundamen-
tal, however, was the fact that many rejected the 
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March’s purpose. They did not believe the 
Movement should use civil disobedience to 
convince the federal government to implement 
redistributive economic policies.
Indeed, even before the end of the 1960s, there 
was no single Civil Rights Movement.2 There had 
always been multiple movements, with different 
goals, different strategies, and different institutional 
manifestations. For some, economic justice had 
always been at the center of what it meant to fight 
for civil rights. The 1963 March on Washington 
had been, after all, a march for jobs and freedom. 
Indeed, many of the early leaders of the Movement, 
such as A. Philip Randolph and W.E.B. Du Bois, 
believed racism was simply one manifestation of 
the economic injustice endemic to unrestrained 
capitalism. For this strand of the Movement, which 
over the years had allied itself with Communists, 
Socialists, social gospel Christians, and the left-
ward edge of the trade union movement, the fight 
for civil rights was a critique of economic inequal-
ity that would require a refashioning of capitalism 
in order to achieve justice for people of all races.3
. . . [W]hen King sought to focus the 
Movement on economic inequality, 
he was trying to revivify an aspect 
of the Movement that many 
thought to be too risky . . . 
Yet from the Movement’s beginnings in the 
years after the end of Reconstruction, many advo-
cates had pursued considerably less radical 
approaches to civil rights that divorced the black 
freedom struggle from issues of economic inequal-
ity. Since Booker T. Washington, the Movement 
had contained a powerful strand of social uplift 
philosophy that emphasized the importance of pre-
senting an image of responsibility and self-reliance 
to the white majority. For many within the black 
bourgeoisie, this philosophy suggested that the 
correct approach to pursuing civil rights was a 
heartfelt embrace of capitalism, markets, and indi-
vidual economic initiative.4
Others within the Movement rooted the fight 
for civil rights within a Christian moral para-
digm that avoided a critique of capitalism, and 
instead emphasized the moral imperative of 
integration and colorblindness. This approach 
was frequently linked, by King and others, to 
aspirational values of political and social (but 
not economic) equality that they rooted in a 
uniquely American constitutional tradition. In 
postwar America, this strand of civil rights 
thought sometimes manifested itself in a more 
secular, scientific mode. It portrayed racism as 
a psychological disorder of particular individu-
als who misunderstood America’s bedrock 
principles, rather than a structural component 
of American political economy. Indeed, in the 
years after World War II, these various 
approaches to civil rights—uplift, a return to 
American values, racism as deviant behavior—
were particularly potent. Anticommunist politi-
cal culture suggested to civil rights leaders that 
grounding antiracism in religious teachings, the 
American civic tradition, and “scientific” 
understandings of racism as a psychological 
pathology were the best ways to convince the 
white majority of the justice of the cause. To 
link the Movement to structural critiques of 
capitalism and advocacy of progressive wealth 
redistribution, on the other hand, was suicide. 
Thus, when King sought to focus the Movement 
on economic inequality, he was trying to reviv-
ify an aspect of the Movement that many 
thought to be too risky to emphasize in the 
years immediately following World War II.5
Finally, the Civil Rights Movement had always 
contained a potent strand of separatist national-
ism. By their very nature, nationalists clashed 
with those who wished to forge interracial alli-
ances for economic justice. Nationalism also con-
tained within it a significant vein of pro-capitalist 
ideology. To be sure, by the 1960s, some national-
ist organizations invoked, with more or less sin-
cerity, communist (or Maoist) ideas. Many 
nationalists, however, dreamed of an autonomous 
African-American economic order within inde-
pendent black communities. While this economic 
order did not look like contemporary American 
industrial capitalism, it had more in common with 
romantic notions of early nineteenth-century, 
small-town capitalism than it had with the robust 
welfare state that King advocated.6
These divisions within the Civil Rights 
Movement suggest that reconstituting it as a 
force focused on eliminating poverty would 
have been difficult even had King lived. Indeed, 
one of the many tragedies of King’s last days 
was the toll these divisions took on him. His 
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biographers uniformly describe him struggling 
with “bouts of near incapacitating depression”7 
brought on by the increasingly bitter, interne-
cine battles within the Movement. King 
attempted to shift the Movement to focus more 
directly on economic inequality while main-
taining his commitment to both nonviolence 
and interracialism. But advocates of other goals 
and tactics plagued him. Some demanded that 
he endorse their priorities. Other derided him as 
out of touch and over the hill. Still others did 
both. The tragedy of the end of King’s life was 
that he had become too powerful a symbol of 
the Civil Rights Movement to be left alone to 
shape it according to his own priorities.8
From the Streets to the Vot-
ing Booth
The existence of these conflicts within the Civil 
Rights Movement did not mean that it ceased to 
concern itself with economic issues after King’s 
death. It did, but using different tactics. 
Historians of the Movement characterize the 
years following the assassination as ones in 
which it stopped acting as a national movement 
of mass protest and refocused its attention on 
electoral politics.9 This shift from the streets to 
the ballot box brought considerable successes, 
even in a political climate that grew increas-
ingly hostile to civil rights. Yet while this move 
into conventional politics brought with it much 
power, it also had profound limitations.
It was only in the 1970s . . . that 
electoral politics became the 
primary strategy used to further 
the civil rights agenda. 
Everyone within the Movement accepted the 
idea that political participation was fundamental 
to the black freedom struggle. Securing some 
form of federal protection for voting rights was 
one of its primary goals in the years following 
World War II. Similarly, voter registration drives 
in the South were the focus of both the SCLC and 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC). As former SNCC chairman John Lewis 
said, “The bottom line was voting.”10 It was only 
in the 1970s, however, that electoral politics 
became the primary strategy used to further the 
civil rights agenda. Those years saw two frac-
tious but energizing National Black Political 
Conventions, as well as the founding of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. These same years 
saw a dramatic increase in the number of African-
American elected officials in the United States. In 
1965, just before the passage of the Voting Rights 
Act, there were 193 African Americans holding 
political office in the United States.11 By 1976, 
that number had risen to 3,979. By 1980, there 
were 4,912.12 Indeed, even this enormous 
increase in office-holding understates the influ-
ence of black voters. As the registration of 
African Americans surged—more than doubling 
in the South between 1965 and 197013—white 
politicians courted their votes with increased 
intensity. This was most obvious in the presiden-
tial election of 1976 in which black votes made 
up Jimmy Carter’s margin of victory.14 This pat-
tern of white politicians courting African-
American voters was replicated throughout the 
country, at all levels of government.
In 1965, just before the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act, there were 
193 African Americans holding 
political office in the United States. 
. . . By 1980, there were 4,912. 
The results of this new emphasis on partisan 
politics were mixed. On the national level, it 
succeeded in promoting issues that were part of 
the traditional civil rights agenda. Jimmy Carter, 
for example, appointed more African-American 
federal judges (thirty-seven, or 14 percent of his 
judicial appointments) than every previous pres-
ident combined.15 His executive branch appoin-
tees were similarly diverse, with 12 percent 
being African American, including high-profile 
appointments such as the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, the Ambassador to the 
United Nations, the Solicitor General, the head 
of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights 
Division, the Secretary of the Army, and the 
Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.16 Similarly, even after the 
Republicans regained control of the presidency 
and the Senate in 1981, the power of black vot-
ers and politicians ensured the enactment of a 
continuing stream of civil rights legislation; some 
passed over President Ronald Reagan’s veto: the 
4 New Labor Forum 00(0)
1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments, the Martin 
Luther King Jr. Holiday Act of 1983, the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, and the 
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988.17
At the federal level, however, the use of the 
political process was singularly unsuccessful in 
expanding the civil rights agenda to include 
legislation aimed at combating poverty more 
generally. African-American leaders expressed 
frustration and anger at Carter’s unwillingness 
to embrace Keynesian economic policies 
designed to reduce unemployment and increase 
wages. Indeed, if there was a single piece of 
legislation that tested the theory that the 
Movement’s turn to electoral politics could fur-
ther King’s economic agenda, it was the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill. As 
originally proposed in 1974, this legislation 
would have required the federal government to 
keep the unemployment rate at or below 4 per-
cent by acting as an employer of last resort dur-
ing economic downturns. Coretta Scott King 
repeatedly emphasized that no legislation 
would be a better tribute to her husband’s leg-
acy. Leading a coalition of labor unions and 
civil rights organizations, she lobbied hard for 
the bill. In the increasingly conservative politi-
cal climate of the 1970s, however, its progres-
sive components were stripped away. Mandates 
became goals. The employment program was 
eliminated, portrayed as both budget-busting 
and inflationary. Indeed, the final version of the 
legislation passed in 1978 only after its goal of 
reducing unemployment had been pushed aside 
by provisions implementing distinctly unredis-
tributive policies such as curbing inflation and 
balancing the federal budget. King and her 
allies claimed a victory, but detached observers 
saw the bill for what it was: toothless sop to 
African-American and white liberal legislators 
with no realistic chance of creating jobs. 
Without a mass movement behind them, these 
political forces had lost the capacity to pass 
truly progressive economic legislation.18
The story of the Movement’s shift to partisan 
politics at the state and local level is rosier.19 This 
was most evident in the South where African-
American political participation transformed the 
region. The number of local African-American 
office holders increased dramatically throughout 
the South during the 1970s, as did the number of 
white politicians who depended on black votes 
for their success. The direct material benefits to 
African Americans brought about through politi-
cal participation were obvious. Lily-white law 
enforcement agencies were integrated. Unpaved 
streets in black neighborhoods were paved, and 
parks sprung up in black communities heretofore 
ignored by local politicians. Public works pro-
grams were desegregated. Public sector jobs 
flowed into the African-American community. 
Changes in government contracting procedures, 
including set asides for minority businesses, 
resulted in increases in black private sector 
employment as well. Thus, as politicians came to 
count on African-American votes, the black 
community benefitted from the traditional spoils 
of the electoral process: “We Provided the Votes” 
editorialized an African American newspaper in 
Los Angeles, “Now We Want the Oats.”20 It may 
not have been the exact sentiment that King 
expressed as he sought to reorient the Movement 
to fight for economic justice, but for many 
African Americans, the effect was the same: 
access to public services and good jobs, and 
entry into the middle class.
White politicians may have become 
responsive to the African-American 
community, but black politicians 
needed to respond to white elite 
interests as well. 
Even at the local level, however, the com-
mitment to partisan politics as the primary 
method of advancing civil rights had significant 
limitations. Interest-group politics was a dou-
ble-edged sword. White politicians may have 
become responsive to the African-American 
community, but black politicians needed to 
respond to white elite interests as well. This fact 
put significant restraints on their ability to 
address fundamental issues of economic 
inequality. The contrast between King’s last 
campaign—to support striking sanitation work-
ers in Memphis—and the outcome of a similar 
strike in Atlanta nine years later vividly illus-
trate the nature of these restraints.
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A Tale of Two Strikes
The details of the Memphis strike are a familiar 
part of King’s biography.21 He traveled to 
Memphis in April of 1968 to organize protests on 
behalf of African-American sanitation workers 
demanding higher pay and an end to dehumaniz-
ing, dangerous working conditions. (The strike 
began after two workers were crushed to death in 
a malfunctioning trash compactor.) Although 
Memphis’ mayor, Henry Loeb, is not as well 
known in the annals of labor and civil rights sup-
pression as other neolithic, southern politicians of 
the era, he played the part to a T: striking workers 
were met with stonewalling, red-baiting, strike-
breakers, and brutal police violence.
King’s assassination ended the strike in 
Memphis. Faced with violent protest throughout 
the country in the aftermath of the murder, fed-
eral officials pressured Loeb into a settlement 
favorable to the union. Although the cost was 
terrible, King seemed to have connected the tac-
tics of nonviolence to the fight for economic 
justice in a manner that transcended race. He 
had linked the traditional institutions of the 
Civil Rights Movement to a labor union—the 
American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME)— that itself 
was at the forefront of promoting interracial 
economic egalitarianism. With its progressive 
leadership and a genuinely integrated member-
ship, AFSCME seemed like the perfect partner 
for a Movement that had focused its attention on 
combating both racial and economic inequality.
Compare the outcome of the Memphis sanita-
tion strike with a similar strike, nine years later 
in Atlanta.22 As in Memphis, Atlanta’s African-
American sanitation workers were hideously 
underpaid, their wages insufficient to bring their 
families’ income above the federal poverty line. 
Similarly, Atlanta’s mayor took a hardline with 
the workers. While he avoided violence, he had 
no qualms about firing the striking workers and 
permanently replacing them with strikebreakers. 
When the workers offered to end the strike in 
exchange for getting their jobs back, the mayor 
bluntly refused them: Their jobs no longer 
existed. Those jobs belonged to the replacement 
workers. The strike and the union were broken.
The most remarkable difference between the 
Memphis strike and the Atlanta strike, however, 
was not the outcome. It was the union’s antago-
nist. While Loeb was one in a long line of 
southern politicians intent on maintaining white 
racial and economic hegemony, Atlanta’s 
mayor was Maynard Jackson, the city’s first 
African-American mayor. Furthermore, the 
city’s civil rights establishment—the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), the Urban League, even the 
SCLC—actively supported Jackson’s union-
busting strategy. Indeed, Jackson’s most out-
spoken supporter was the slain civil rights 
leader’s father, Martin Luther King Sr., the 
longtime minster at Atlanta’s Ebenezer Baptist 
Church. Most disturbingly, the elder King 
deployed rhetoric drawn from the playbook of 
the Civil Rights Movement’s white supremacist 
opponents. Labor unrest, King told the Atlanta 
Constitution, was the result of outside agitators, 
particularly the leadership of AFSCME: “If any 
group comes in to try to destroy our town, we 
are against it, with all the power we have.”23
. . . [In the 1977 sanitation workers’ 
strike] Atlanta’s . . . civil rights 
establishment . . . actively supported 
[Mayor Maynard] Jackson’s union-
busting strategy. 
Jackson was explicit about his reasons for 
breaking the strike. He felt intense pressure to 
be fiscally prudent, perhaps more than a white 
mayor might have. Accusing black politicians 
of fiscal irresponsibility had, after all, been the 
stock in trade of the white supremacist redeem-
ers who put an end to Reconstruction and dis-
franchised African Americans in the late 
nineteenth century. Accordingly, the image of 
Atlanta’s first African-American mayor plung-
ing the city into debt was not one that Jackson 
was willing to countenance. “Before I take the 
city into a deficit . . . elephants will roost in 
trees.”24 Similarly, as he ran for reelection that 
year, Jackson needed to appeal not only to the 
African-American middle class but also to 
Atlanta’s white middle class, and to the city’s 
business elites. Indeed, Jackson’s alliance with 
white business interests was replicated by black 
mayors in most cities where they were elected.25 
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Politics was a double-edged sword. By the 
1970s, white politicians courted African-
American voters by furthering their interests. 
Black politicians, in turn, had to gain the sup-
port of powerful interests within the white busi-
ness community if they wished to stay in power. 
The need for this sort of political pragmatism 
meant that as the Movement became primarily 
devoted to electoral politics, its ability to pro-
mote progressive economic policies was 
severely limited.
. . . [W]hat . . . progressive 
politicians, both black and white, 
had discovered by the 1980s was 
that “they were generals without 
armies.” 
Not every African-American politician made 
the same compromises with elite business inter-
ests that Jackson and other African-American 
big city majors did. For these black progres-
sives, however, the shift from protests to ballots 
caused a different problem: It was often hard to 
pursue progressive economic policies in the 
political realm without accompanying social 
protest. The failure of Humphrey-Hawkins was 
proof positive of this fact.26 Similar problems 
emerged in states and localities. In his wonder-
ful history of Civil Rights Movement in north-
ern states, Sweet Land of Liberty, Thomas 
Sugrue describes Roxanne Jones, an African-
American state senator from Philadelphia, 
fighting to realize King’s dream of economic 
egalitarian public policy.27 In office from 1985 
until her death in 1996, her legislative agenda 
included policies, small and large, designed to 
protect Pennsylvania’s poorest and most vul-
nerable citizens: rehabilitation programs for 
drug-addicted mothers, health care for AIDS 
patients, financial assistance for the elderly, 
heating aid and medical assistance for the poor. 
Most of these initiatives failed. Indeed, most of 
her career was spent in unsuccessful attempts to 
limit the pernicious effects of Ronald Reagan’s 
cuts to welfare (“human genocide,” she called 
it28) and subsequent welfare “reform” legisla-
tion. Jones, who had cut her teeth in the National 
Welfare Rights Organization, and had been a 
participant in the Poor People’s March, was, by 
nature, more of an activist than a politician. But 
what she and other progressive politicians, both 
black and white, had discovered by the 1980s 
was that “they were generals without armies.”29 
Too often, the Movement’s shift from the streets 
to the ballot box left the politicians who wished 
to further King’s dream of a racially and eco-
nomically egalitarian society unable to mobi-
lize the social protest that would have turned 
that dream into a reality.
Making the Whispered Dream 
Reality
The fifty years since King’s murder have not 
been good ones for progressives engaged in the 
fight for economic justice. Republican thirst for 
tax cuts, welfare reform, deregulation, and 
union busting have eviscerated the social safety 
net. Similarly, the Democratic Party has evi-
denced little stomach for expanding the welfare 
state, or otherwise slowing the dramatic 
increase in income inequality that has occurred 
since the early 1970s. None of this was caused 
by King’s assassination. Nor is it the fault of the 
Civil Rights Movement. An amorphous mass 
movement cannot make blameworthy choices. 
Historical circumstances dictated its fractious 
nature, which, in turn, made it a poor candidate 
to be the vanguard of a movement for combat-
ing economic inequality. Its turn to partisan 
politics was similarly unconscious. Indeed, 
after the remarkable success of the Voting 
Rights Act, it would have been shocking if the 
Movement had not gravitated toward the use of 
the political power that African Americans had 
previously been denied through violence, fraud, 
and legal disfranchisement.
Broad social movements are by their very 
nature chaotic, restless entities. They are diffi-
cult to focus on a unified goal, even by a leader 
as gifted as King. Yet advocates for social jus-
tice do not have the luxury of abandoning them, 
in all their messiness, for the well-worn chan-
nels of party politics. Indeed, what brought 
about the Civil Rights Movement’s successes—
from Birmingham to Selma, from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to the Voting Rights Act—
was King’s ability to blend these two forms of 
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advocacy. The whispered dream—“imagine 
our society, if only King had lived”—can only 
be realized by doing so.
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